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Abstract: This paper provides a search-theoretic microfoundation to the popular view
according to which rich but poorly talented individuals crowd out poorer and more
talented individuals from schooling. We consider a two-sector, two schooling level
matching model of unemployment with ex-post rent-sharing. Individuals diﬀer in
ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and there
is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education originates com-
position eﬀects in the distribution of skills across sectors. This in turn modifies
the intensity of job creation, implying the private and social returns to schooling
always diﬀer. Agents with large schooling costs — the poor — select themselves too
much, while there is too little self-selection among the low schooling cost individuals
— the rich. We also show that education should, on average, be more taxed than
subsidized.
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